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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter introduces the social psychology of ethnic and political division in
Northern Ireland, documents continuing segregation and division since the
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, and calls for culturally oriented conflict
transformation. Many of the circumstances on which unionists and loyalists
based their political assumptions and the institutions on which they relied have
changed significantly. Feelings of disorientation and alienation persist. With the
end of Direct Rule, political persuasion, lobbying, public relations, and
grassroots organizing have become increasingly important, and it is critical that
unionists, and particularly working-class loyalists, feel empowered and have the
organizing capacity to influence democratic politics without violence.
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But if we grant that symbolic systems are social products that contribute to
making the world, that they do not simply mirror social relations but help
constitute them, then one can, within limits, transform the world by
transforming its representation.
—Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:14)
In 2005, as we drove through Portadown, a primarily Protestant Northern
Ireland town, a friend and colleague who lives there pointed out a mural1 and
said simply, “There's King Rat.” The mural featured a portrait of a man with
close-cropped hair and a goatee flanked by garlands of poppies and orange lilies.
Banners over and beneath the portrait read, “In honour of Grenadier William
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Introduction
‘Billy’ Wright LVF. ” Below, two masked gunmen wearing spats and white belts
brandished automatic weapons and gazed up at the visage of Wright. Between
them, a scroll displayed a verse from the New Testament of the Bible: “Greater
love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends — John
15:13” (see figures 1.1 and 1.2).
The mural on the Brownstown Road valorized a contentious figure who not only
threatened Catholics but was a lightning rod for divisions within loyalist
paramilitary organizations.2 Wright was a notorious dissident loyalist
paramilitary leader who was ousted from the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and
formed the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) in 1997 after his organization
allegedly killed a Catholic taxi driver, Michael McGoldrick. In December 1997,
Wright was assassinated in the Maze prison by fellow prisoners who were
members of the republican Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Like many
murals, Wright's could conjure fear, mistrust, grief, triumph, or honor, depending
on the viewer's own experience and perspective.
On a return visit to Portadown only two years later, I found that the mural had
been replaced with a commemorative tribute to the famous footballer3 George
Best, one of Europe's all-time best players who hailed from East Belfast. This
time, the banners on the mural were blue and simply read, “George Best 1946–
2005” above the logo of the Irish Football Association.4 This clear and
intentional change in public symbols on the Brownstown Road has become
common in Protestant, unionist, and loyalist (PUL) communities across Northern
Ireland as initiatives are undertaken to alter familiar symbols and practices
including flags, parades, and bonfires as part of a cultural transformation in the
region.
In a commemorative garden a short distance from the mural, at the center of a
flagstone patio sat a large polished granite stone with the inscription: “In
memory of all victims of conflict.” In the background, at the rear corners of the
patio, sat (p.4)
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two small tablets, each inscribed:
“In loving memory of” alongside
several individuals’ names. One
held the names of Billy Wright and
another LVF member; the other
listed four UVF members. Each
stone bore the familiar loyalist
commemorative phrase, “At the
going down of the sun and in the
morning we will remember them,”
from Laurence Binyon's poem,
“For the Fallen” (see figures 1.3
and 1.4).

I had the opportunity to
interview Gareth and Daniel,
two men involved with a local
community organization that
helped organize the mural
redesign and commemorative
garden.5 Gareth pointed out
that the garden was carefully
arranged so that the larger
stone could be read by
passersby on the sidewalk or
the road while the smaller
tablets were intentionally
inclined upward so that they

Figure 1.1 A mural honoring Billy
Wright, a founder of the Loyalist
Volunteer Force (LVF), photographed
June 29, 2005.

could only be read by people who entered the garden and walked to its back
corners. The arrangement of the garden diminishes the prominence of the kinds
of violent images and references that had dominated the original Billy Wright
mural nearby. However, according to Gareth, the design of the mural and garden
projects involved a difficult, months-long process of consultations, and while the
removal of the Wright mural brought tears of grief to some eyes during the
unveiling, others expressed (p.5)

Page 3 of 24

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 04 November 2020

Introduction
their appreciation and a sense of
liberation. He described the
thought that went into the design
of the garden:

The symbolic nature of those
two constituencies [LVF and
UVF] sharing the same space
as a reflective space, I think,
was a considerable
achievement locally. But, we
were very conscious we
didn’t want that space to
become a shrine for
paramilitarism …. We then
secured a huge bit of Mourne
granite, and we said, “We
want to rein this back into
being a community space,”
and there is a huge stone
right in the middle that a
blind man can see. Literally,
“In loving memory of all
victims of conflict,” full stop.
You can interpret that
whatever way you want.

Figure 1.2 A mural honoring Billy Wright
was replaced with a mural celebrating
George Best. Brownstown Road,
Portadown, photographed January 20,
2007.

One must wonder whether
everyone grieving a victim of
the conflict would feel comfortable reflecting on their loss in a garden in the
presence of the two smaller stones, but the change is nonetheless significant.
Such shifts in the symbolic landscape lead us to inquire about concomitant
changes in the social psychological landscape of a region where ethnopolitical
conflict has been perpetuated by both violence and prejudices. If the downward
spiral of fear and retaliation that characterized thirty years of paramilitary and
military violence accompanied a proliferation of antagonistic symbols and (p.6)
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rituals, what accounts for a
widespread, if incomplete, trend in
the opposite direction? How are
such changes negotiated within
and between polarized
communities? Who is involved in
the mitigation of polarizing
cultural expressions and why?
What does the process look like,
and what does it tell us about the
potential to transform intractable
conflict? Those are the questions
we will explore.

Collective identities and the
ritual and symbolic actions that
shape and maintain them are
recursively related with one
another, and much of this book
concerns itself with the

Figure 1.3 Granite monuments to “all
victims of conflict”. Brownstown Road,
Portadown, photographed January 20,
2007.

renovation of public displays of Protestant unionist and loyalist identity. By
redesigning bonfires and murals (such as, the Wright-Best mural in Portadown)
or choreographing Orange and loyalist band parades in ways that mitigate some
of their most offensive facets, unionist and loyalist activists introduce new values
carefully reconciled with long-held understandings of their collective identities.
The result is a softening of a politically charged symbolic landscape and a
reconsideration of polarized ethnopolitical identities. In some cases, symbols can
become shared across the ethnopolitical divide. In other cases, the process of
adopting new symbols and practices or shaping collective memories through the
construction of historical narratives can open opportunities for cross-community
dialogue.
(p.7)
This is not a post-conflict process
but rather a continuation of
conflict by other means. Conflict
in Northern Ireland has long been
contested by many means:
political, economic, cultural, and
military. The central story of the
peace process has been a long
shift away from violent and
coercive methods toward
persuasive and political ones, and
we might do well to adopt
Brewer's (2010) nomenclature of
“post-violent society” while acknowledging (as Brewer does) that political and
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sectarian violence does not necessarily end neatly when political negotiations get
under way (Brewer 2010:16–28, 32–33). The conflict is, instead, in a state of transition.
Such shifts are not merely the product of strategic calculations, though they may be
shaped by pragmatism. They are imagined, debated, and adopted by people with
collective identities that have been catalyzed in threatening, unjust, and often violent
circumstances. Indeed, ethnic and political identities have become closely linked to
calculuses of winning and losing. This is not to say that identities or strategies are
monolithic. New strategies can be and have been introduced, but unless or until they
align, or are made to align, with collective identities, they are unlikely to be fully
adopted. How even the most ideologically committed organizations come to mitigate or
replace violent or offensive activities warrants our attention as well as the ways in
which collective identities and community relations change in tandem.

(p.8) Although I have chosen
to focus on the Protestant
community, a study such as, this
could be productively
undertaken within Catholic and
nationalist organizations and
communities. Republican

Figure 1.4 Granite monument to Loyalist
Volunteer Force (LVF)
paramilitaries.Brownstown Road,
Portadown, photographed January 20,
2007.

leaders in Sinn Féin, the largest political party within the republican movement,
have carefully reframed republicanism since they rediscovered the potential of
nonviolent action and then constitutional politics over the course of the hunger
strike of 1981 (Shirlow and McGovern 1998). Protestants are arguably facing
equal if not greater challenges in adapting to new political and economic
circumstances. Many of the institutions around which Protestants, unionists, and
loyalists historically rallied have been relinquished or suffer from decline.
Working-class Protestants, especially, feel they need new organizing skills, a
shared sense of confidence, and more social capital to participate and benefit
fully in the newly emerging Northern Ireland.
This book documents an emerging, if tenuous, process in which prominent
conservative unionist and loyalist organizations, such as, the Orange Order6 and
other voluntary organizations, are seeking to cultivate political and social capital
by abandoning practices that are seen as sectarian or offensive and engaging
more proactively in public relations. These are unfamiliar strategies for
Protestants who have tended to feel that change is a harbinger of defeat. Thus,
the process of internal transformation is a slow and contentious one as leaders
work to introduce new policies and practices while continuing to hew to deeply
held beliefs about themselves, the conflict, and their role in it.
Brewer and Higgins (1998) identify three domains in which sectarianism and
division have been perpetuated in Northern Ireland: ideas, individual behavior,
and social structure.7 The prominence of each domain can vary across a range of
social situations, such as, class divides, but each reinforces the others in an
extensive system of division and inequality. Prejudices and stereotypes reflect
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power differentials in the social structure and underpin destructive individual
behavior in the forms of discrimination, intimidation, and violence (pp. 2, 183).
The structural contexts in which conflict transformation occurs are important,
and much strong scholarship on Northern Ireland tracks the shifting interacting
political, economic, and demographic contours that influence the trajectory of
the region's conflict. Thus, chapter 3 will present essential historical and
political background information that is essential for interpreting an everimportant micro-sociological context. In this book, I focus on ideas (cultural
schemata and identities) and behavior (political and cultural collective action),
asserting that conflict transformation involves both a shift from coercive means
of engaging in conflict toward more persuasive ones as well as subjective
redefinitions of in-groups and out-groups. Paradoxically, much of the critical
work of transforming conflict and developing less polarized collective identities
takes place within even the most conservative and traumatized communities and
organizations, and we will consider the experience of Protestant/unionist/loyalist
(PUL) activists and organizations in Northern Ireland where innovations in
traditional cultural expressions contribute to reshaping the contours of unionist
and loyalist identities.

(p.9) Northern Ireland and the Possibility of Sustainable Peace
For a sustainable peace to emerge, emotions, identities, and ideologies, as well
as the rituals and cultural expressions that sustain them, must begin to
accommodate one another. The process of replacing a culture of mistrust and
fear with one of cooperation is a slow tenuous process, and contention across
the ethnopolitical divide will continue. However, we can say that a conflict is in a
state of transformation when fundamentally polarized in-group and out-group
perceptions have begun to change, albeit slowly and incrementally. For more
than twelve centuries, Ireland has been marked by legacies of invasion,
colonialism, and conflict. With the wide-scale influx of English and Scottish
settlers from the beginning of the seventeenth century and the subsequent
rebellions and subjugation of the Gaelic Irish population, the stage was set for
four centuries of conflict over the merits and injustice of British rule, even
though the lines of contention never perfectly conformed to a religious divide
between Catholics and Protestants. From the seventeenth century to World War
II, economic interests, European geopolitics, and British concerns about the
security of its western flank drove British policies with regard to Ireland.
However, religious and ethnic divisions increasingly came to parallel political
contention over issues such as, sovereignty and equality. The potent combination
of divergent political agendas and ethnic and religious prejudice, or
“sectarianism,” has limited dialogue, creative problem solving, and compromise,
leaving suspicion, fear, and often violence to feed on one another (Liechty 1995;
Liechty and Clegg 2001).
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Among cases such as, the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
and Israel/Palestine, in which core ethnopolitical identities have contributed to
zero-sum mentalities, Northern Ireland has received considerable attention,
especially with regard to “the Troubles,” the period of armed conflict among
paramilitaries and state security forces that is usually considered to span the
period from 1968 to 1998. The conflict produced over 3,700 deaths and ten
times as many injuries between 1969 and 2001 (Smyth and Hamilton 2003:18–
19). Thankfully, Northern Ireland has also become remarkable for its ongoing
political peace process. Negotiations between the British government and the
paramilitary Irish Republican Army (IRA) as well as between John Hume, the
leader of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Gerry
Adams, the leader of the republican political party, Sinn Féin, developed into
more than two decades of political negotiations involving the British and Irish
governments, local parties, and international intermediaries.8
As the paramilitary cease-fires have remained relatively stable since 1994, and
political negotiations have continued despite intermittent suspensions of the
power sharing Northern Ireland Assembly9 that was established under the terms
of the 1998 Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA), the prospects of a return
to widespread violence have diminished, and the future of politics has (p.10)
increasingly become a question of when political institutions will stabilize.
Backdoor political negotiations and all-party talks have led to a political peace
process that, at the time of writing, features a legislative power sharing
arrangement in the form of the Northern Ireland Assembly, led by Sinn Féin and
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), formerly the most diametrically opposed
parties. After having been suspended several times, the resurrection of the
Northern Ireland Assembly in 2006 was followed by an executive partnership in
2007 between firebrand Free Presbyterian Church founder and staunch unionist
politician, Ian Paisley, and Martin McGuinness, who served as Officer
Commanding of the Provisional IRA in Derry in the 1970s. The friendly
relationship between the new first minister and deputy first minister astonished
even the savviest pundits.
Northern Ireland's peace process and power sharing government have rightly
become celebrated examples of patient and painstaking peacemaking
underpinned by decades of largely unsung grassroots work by peace and conflict
resolution organizations (PCROs). Yet, the challenge of grassroots peacebuilding
remains (Cochrane and Dunn 2002; Fitzduff 2002; Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld
2002).10 Significant structural and psychological barriers persist, not to mention
the relative fragility of the political process. We should celebrate the tremendous
progress that has been made in ending one of the world's longest running
violent conflicts while acknowledging that the collective psychological and
emotional wounds that need healing must continue to be addressed as all
involved build a vibrant and cooperative democracy.
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Polarized ethnopolitical identities remain among the most significant obstacles
to building a healthy multicultural civil society in Northern Ireland and
elsewhere around the world. Subjective interpretations of the conflict and
intercommunity and intracommunity relations among Protestants and Catholics
are all subject to change, and yet, they are not easily changed, especially while
the trauma of thirty years of recent violent conflict remains fresh. However,
subjective dimensions of the conflict have been shifting in ways that have made
space for much of the political progress to date and have in turn been facilitated
by political developments, such as, the cease-fires and power sharing
governance.
How political change takes place in the context of the paradoxical malleability
and tenacity of ethnopolitical identities deserves attention (Hayes 1990:4). A
sustainable peace depends on the ability of even the most ideologically
committed organizations and individuals to develop new interpretations of
themselves and adversaries that make space for dialogue, cooperation, and
coexistence. By delving into the contemporary experience of Protestants
involved with unionist and loyalist organizations and activities, we find an
uncharted and difficult process of renegotiating the past, present, and future
that is central to contemporary peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. This volume
explores those subterranean cultural and social psychological processes that
accompany the more visible headline-making developments in the political
sphere.
(p.11) In subsequent chapters, we will examine how charged ethnopolitical
symbols and rituals among unionists and loyalists, such as, Orange parades,
murals, music, dancing, and historical activities, influence and facilitate the
construction of ethnopolitical identity. Among Protestants who have long felt
“under siege,” redesigning murals to replace images of masked gunmen with
local historical figures and World War I battle scenes in France and Belgium and
working with the Northern Ireland Tourist Board to attract visitors to annual
Orange parades signal a shift from their former defensive orientation. It is
important to note that innovations in traditional cultural expressions are not
attempts at reconciliation. They continue to communicate narratives of a
distinctive Protestant experience and thus inscribe difference, but they
constitute a reorientation, an interest in enhancing Protestants’ abilities to
engage effectively in discourse and debate. The overall effect is to soften social
psychological boundaries and make dialogue and relationship building across
the ethnopolitical divide more likely. The results may seem modest, but they
reflect the depth of division that has made intractable conflict so difficult to
manage in Northern Ireland.

Intractable Ethnopolitical Conflict

Page 9 of 24

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 04 November 2020

Introduction
Intractable ethnopolitical conflict, of which Northern Ireland has been
considered a primary case, has proven a prominent and growing global social
problem over the past century and can be found at the root of most ongoing
major violent conflicts and wars in recent decades (Scherrer 2008). Social
scientists have struggled to conceptualize the powerful forces that can be
generated when major political disputes parallel lines of ethnic and racial
division. Symbolic expressions of ethnic identity and political ideology represent
and reproduce psychocultural schemata in which groups find ontological
security and through which organizations build consensus and mobilize for
(sometimes violent) political action. Conflict over human rights, inequality, and
sovereignty within disputed borders all take place within what Marc Ross (2009)
has called contested “symbolic landscapes” in which collective senses of identity
among warring or contending populations can become magnified and mutually
polarized, providing fertile ground for fear, dehumanization, violence, and a
downward spiral of retaliation and division.
Intractable ethnopolitical conflicts, which Mats Friberg and John Paul Lederach
refer to as “identity conflicts,” are so tenacious in large part because they are
driven by deeply psychological and emotional forces converging with large-scale
structural forces (Lederach 1997:8). At the individual level, victims of bombings,
assassinations, and punishment attacks struggle with the trauma that
accompanies the brutalization of a neighbor or loved one. At group or
community level, intimidation and fear encourage defensive attitudes,
stereotyping, and racism or sectarianism as cultural schemata are constructed
that interpret and legitimize the grievances and aspirations of each community,
and in many cases, valorize (p.12) those who have taken up arms in the name
of communal defense (Liechty 1995:15; Brewer and Higgins 1998).
In extreme conflict situations, adversaries’ identities can become defined such
that they are mutually opposed to one another, indivisible and nonnegotiable.
They become inseparable from the conflict that comes to be understood in zerosum terms of “us” and “them.” Using this calculus, any gain by one side amounts
to an unacceptable loss by the other side. Each group feels as if its very
existence is under threat, and each responds defensively, further modifying their
own interpretive schemata to distinguish their opponents from themselves in
even more stark terms, justifying more extreme action against opponents (Tajfel
1981; Waddell and Cairns 1986; Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson 1989;
Northrup 1997; Brewer and Higgins 1998; Coy and Woehrle 2000).
Such conflicts become “intractable” in part because the vicious cycle involving
identity and violence becomes almost seamless. As Terrell Northrup (1992)
points out, a cultural “collusion” can develop between adversaries in ethnic
conflict. By defining themselves and each other primarily in terms of their
mutual antagonism, they collude with each other in perpetuating the
psychological bases for destructive conflict. Political struggles, such as, those in
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Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, that
have centered around core group identities are known to be particularly
contentious and susceptible to intractability (Cairns 1994; Kriesberg 1998b;
Northrup 1989).
Identity plays such a crucial role in these conflicts because shared schemata for
perceiving and making sense of the world direct ethnic groups to interpret their
actions and those of their opponents in ways that protect in-group ontological
security (Kriesberg 2007:55–56, 157–58). Ross (2001) calls these schemata
“psychocultural interpretations” or “the shared, deeply rooted worldviews that
help groups make sense of daily life and provide psychologically meaningful
accounts of a group's relationship with other groups, their actions and
motives” (p. 189). Worldviews that become widely shared as “collective
identities” are constructed and continually reconstructed from origin myths,
historical narratives, commentary on contemporary states of affairs, and
teleological visions (Brewer and Higgins 1998).
Ethnopolitical conflict features closely related symbolic and social dimensions.
Narratives that shape collective identities may compel people to collective
action, sometimes to violence. Participation in conflict shapes the way groups
perceive themselves and their opponents and how they express collective
identities. Rituals and the public display of symbols organize perceptions and
call people to solidarity by celebrating in-group narratives and values and
casting others in adversarial roles. They stake claims to rights and preferred
political arrangements and demonstrate a collective will. Symbolic displays can
themselves become central issues of contention, perpetuating conflict. Irish
language signs and band parades, for example, are often said to mark out
territory in Northern Ireland in exclusive ways.
(p.13) Polarized communal identities are constructed and reconstructed on a
daily basis over long periods of time, sometimes spectacularly (through
intimidation and direct attacks) or symbolically (public rituals, flags, and
emblems), and sometimes in quite mundane ways (what newspaper one buys,
where one shops, or where one attends school) Hamilton, Hansson, Bell, and
Toucas 2008. Each becomes invested with emotional value, and one of the
greatest challenges in addressing intractable conflict in divided societies lies in
slowing and reversing a vicious and yet, often subtle cycle of out-group
prejudice, dehumanization, coercion, and fear. To the extent that opponents in
an ethnopolitical conflict situation ignore, condone, or openly advocate
exploitation over another group, those parties will heighten the boundaries
between them by intensifying distinctions and casting blame. Inter-group
boundaries can become so rigid and others vilified and dehumanized to such an
extent that group members become more likely to sanction, overlook, or employ
the use of lethal force, fueling a cycle of fear, retribution, and division.
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In intractable conflicts, according to social identity theorists, natural tendencies
to create in-group and out-group distinctions become heightened as each group
feels under threat and rallies around increasingly defensive collective identities
seeking to maintain ontological security. It is worth noting, however, that the
construction of in-group and out-group identities is part and parcel of social life.
Cognitive psychologists assert that all people have a limited capacity for
processing stimuli from the world around them. They simplify the world through
social schemata, stereotypes, or ideologies, thus meeting a need for ontological
coherence (Tajfel 1982; Cairns 1994). They are also compelled to maintain a
positive sense of self-worth, self-efficacy, and self-authenticity (Melucci 1995;
Gecas 2000). The combination of these drives produces solidarity and in-group
cohesion, while comparison with out-groups facilitates the process. Two leading
scholars of social identity theory, Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, (1986) have
derived the following theoretical principles:
Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity.
Positive social identity is based largely on favorable comparisons that can
be made between the in-group and some relevant out-groups: the in-group
must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant
out-groups.
When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave
their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to
make their existing group more positively distinct (p. 16).
Unfortunately, in deeply divided societies in which groups have come to fear one
another, the option of leaving one's own group is often limited, either because
social solidarity costs are too high, or there simply are not other groups readily
available to which one can switch.
As Ed Cairns (1994), a psychologist at the University of Ulster in Northern
Ireland, has put it, “What I hope Social Identity Theory will do is influence
people (p.14) to see the conflict as a form of behavior which is determined by
essentially normal psychological processes, but normal psychological processes
which are operating in exceptional circumstances” (p. 14). Those circumstances
include a long history of colonialism, resistance, discrimination, open conflict,
and in many cases poverty. Political struggles of this sort that involve core group
identities have proven particularly contentious and susceptible to intractability
(Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson 1989; Northrup 1989; Cairns 1994; Kriesberg
1998b; Weiner 1998; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2005). Once destructive
conflict is under way, a range of factors can cause the conflict to deepen. These
include groupthink, organizational inertia, specialized vested interests,
miscommunications, coercive strategies, changes in organizational makeup, and
external intervention (Kriesberg 2007:155–81). The institutionalization of
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conflict parallels the polarization of ethnopolitical identities contributing to a
vicious cycle of conflict escalation.
Ethnopolitical Division in Northern Ireland

A range of political, religious, and ethnic traditions in Northern Ireland tend to
align broadly into Protestant/unionist/loyalist and Catholic/nationalist/republican
blocs that maintain incompatible views on the history and sovereignty of six of
the nine counties that make up the region called Ulster.11 Over centuries of
conflict in Ireland, especially since the late eighteenth century, and more
recently over the course of the “Troubles,” from approximately 1968 to 1998,
Northern Ireland has become a deeply divided society in which Protestants and
Catholics have been pushed and pulled into segregated public and cultural
spheres. Often, division and segregation have been the direct result of British
colonialism, unionist rule through the middle of the twentieth century,
paramilitary intimidation, and radical political movements. Protestants and
Catholics have also routinely segregated themselves in education, housing,
sports, and arts, to name a few domains. Motivating factors include fear, anger,
habit, familiarity, and tradition, and while a great deal of attention is paid to the
working-class communities in which paramilitarism and the state's counterterrorism efforts have been focused, ethnopolitical division is subtly perpetuated
throughout society (Liechty and Clegg 2001:107–10).
Over a decade after the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,12
Northern Ireland remains significantly divided despite continuing progress in
developing a pluralist agenda (Hughes, Donnelly, Robinson, and Dowds 2003;
MacGinty, Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007). The consultation paper A Shared
Future (2003) published by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First
Minister outlines concerns over ongoing ethnopolitical division.
• In order to achieve this vision we must deal with the very deep and
painful divisions in our society that have been exacerbated by more
than 30 years of conflict. Some progress has been made, but there is
clear evidence that deep divisions remain.
(p.15) • Violence at interfaces between communities continues to
affect lives, property, businesses and public services.
• Whilst levels of tolerance and respect for diversity within the
Protestant and Catholic Communities had been improving, there is
evidence that they have decreased recently.
• Housing has become more segregated over the last 20 years. More
than 70% of Housing Executive Estates are more than 90% Protestant
or more than 90% Roman Catholic.
• Around 95% of children still attend separated schools. Despite
evidence that more parents would prefer this option, there has only
been a small increase in the number of children attending integrated
schools.
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• There are high levels of racial prejudice in Northern Ireland and the
situation has recently become worse. The rate of racial incidents here
is estimated at 16.4 per 1000 non-white population, compared to
12.65 per 1000 in England and Wales.
• There is little change in the extent of inter-community friendship
patterns.
• In some urban areas further divisions are emerging within local
communities. This is linked to paramilitary influence, especially at
interfaces.
• People's lives continue to be shaped by community division.
Research suggests that, in some areas, community division plays a
large part in the choices that people make about where they work,
and how they use leisure facilities and public services.
• Northern Ireland remains a deeply segregated society with little
indication of progress towards becoming more tolerant or inclusive.
(pp. 1–2)
As Stephen Farry (2006), a former general secretary of the Alliance Party, has
declared in a United States Institute for Peace Special Report on Northern
Ireland, “Peace has come at the price of reconciliation” (p. 27).
Survey research indicates that despite progress in consociational political
arrangements, social attitudes remain significantly polarized. More worryingly,
young people's attitudes tend to be less favorable to integration than adults’,
especially among Protestant youth (McAuley 2004a; Leonard 2008; Hayes and
McAllister 2009). According to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey
(NILTS),13 the decade leading up to and immediately following the signing of the
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (1989–1999) witnessed a general improvement
in adults’ attitudes about community relations, especially among Catholic
respondents. However, between 1996 and 1999, both Protestants (17 percent to
26 percent) and Catholics (11 percent to 18 percent) increasingly reported
wishing to live in neighborhoods populated by only people of their own religious
background, essentially returning to 1989 levels.14 The same trend held for
preferred workplace arrangements, though more Catholic adults (57 percent
rising to 72 percent) came to prefer integrated schools in contrast to fewer
Protestant adults (65 percent declining to 57 percent), a (p.16) trend that
fluctuated between Protestants and Catholics until 2003 when Protestants began
to more consistently prefer mixed religion schools (ARK 1998–2008; Hughes and
Donnelly 2003:652–53; Hayes and McAllister 2009).
Census data for 2001 show that 66 percent of the population in Northern Ireland
live in areas that are more than 99 percent Protestant or more than 99 percent
Catholic (up from 63 percent at the 1991 census; Brown 2002; Shirlow 2003).
The 2003 Young Life and Times (YLT) survey of 16-year-olds in Northern Ireland
reports that living in segregated areas significantly diminishes the likelihood of
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having friends from the other religious community (Devine and Schubotz 2004:
2–3),15 and research by Peter Shirlow (2003) indicates that 68 percent of 18- to
25-year-olds in neighborhoods in Belfast separated by “peace lines” have never
had a meaningful conversation with anyone from the other (Protestant/Catholic)
community.
Attitudes about mixing tend to be more stable than attitudes about community
relations (Schubotz and Devine 2009:4), and among adult respondents who
participated in the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes and NILTS surveys, Hughes
et al. (2003) have noted a growing pessimism about the state of community
relations since the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was signed, especially among
Protestants. By 2001, the percentage believing relations between Protestants
and Catholics “are better now than five years ago” had returned to nearly 1994
levels (before Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries declared cease-fires) of just
below 30 percent. The same was true for Protestants’ predictions of the state of
community relations in five years’ time.
As of 2003, the YLT survey indicated that youth attitudes about community
relations were ambiguous. Large minorities of respondents reported
“favourable” attitudes toward the other community (38 percent for Protestants;
45 percent for Catholic), and larger percentages were more likely to say they felt
“neither favourable nor unfavourable” toward the other community (49 percent
for Protestants and 43 percent for Catholics). Just over half reported that they
often or sometimes socialized with people from a different religious background.
Levels of geographical segregation seemed more severe than youths’ attitudes,
but national identities remained important for three out of five YLT respondents
(Devine and Schubotz 2004; Muldoon, Trew, Todd, Rougier, and McLaughlin
2007). From 2003 to 2007, 16-year-olds in the YLT have been significantly and
consistently less open than NILTS adults to religious mixing in neighborhoods,
workplaces, and schools. In 2007, just under 50 percent of youth (Protestant and
Catholic) supported integrated educational settings, with Catholics more
reticent than Protestants (Schubotz and Devine 2009).
The picture with regard to community relations has improved but continues to
signal fundamental divisions. By 2008, in the wake of renewed devolution, the
percentage of adult respondents reporting they felt relations were better than
five years ago had more than doubled from 2001 to 65 percent. Preferences for
mixed religion neighborhoods rose to 83 percent, preferences for mixed
educational settings rose to 70 percent, and preferences for mixed religion
workplaces rose (p.17) to 94 percent. In each of these domains, percentages
fell between 2 percent and 8 percent in 2009 for adults, and while youths’
attitudes tracked adults’ on improvements in community relations, they
continued to lag on integration concerns by 17 percent to 20 percent (ARK
2008a,b; ARK 2009a,b). NILTS results indicate rising optimism among adults,
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but the potential for polarization remains, especially considering youth
preferences to maintain structural divides along traditional ethnonational lines.
Though this study focuses on adults, it delves into the social landscape where
deeply socialized identities, political fears, and their expressions meet new
structural circumstances and inspire strategizing and innovation. To capture the
deeply held beliefs and ideas that constitute communal identities and buttress
prejudices and stereotypes and to document the strategic thinking and activities
through which identity transformation occurs, it can be necessary to focus on
one community or set of organizations on one side of an ethnopolitical divide
instead of undertaking cross-community research. In this case, I have focused on
Protestants, often on working-class Protestants, who, either by virtue of their
organizational affiliation or the areas in which they live and work, endorse,
advocate, or are familiar with unionist and loyalist ideology and identity, which I
refer to as “grassroots unionism”; McAuley (1997) refers to this domain of
unionism as “community unionism” or “communitarian unionism” (p. 159).
In focusing on a range of distinctly Protestant and unionist or loyalist
organizations and communities in this project, I adopt Liechty and Clegg's
(2001) “chastened ‘two-traditions’ logic,” which recognizes considerable
religious, political, and economic diversity across Northern Ireland but also
acknowledges an unavoidable and prominent religious and national divide
between Protestants and Catholics (p. 36; Muldoon et al. 2007). In describing
the divide, Eyben, Morrow, and Wilson (1997) said, “Churches, sports, political
parties, central policy makers, law and order, local government, community
sector, business all reflect, and sometimes contribute to the division of people in
Northern Ireland into two major identity groups. Sometimes, the fault line
appears dormant; at other times it lies wide open and raw. Whatever its state, it
is always present” (p. 1). At the same time, identity change is a central theme of
this book, and it is dangerous to generalize and overlook diversity within the
Catholic and Protestant population (Rolston 1998; Nic Craith 2002). This is
perhaps especially true for Protestants, among whom one finds considerable
class divisions, a disjointed organizational infrastructure, and denominational
divisions. I will endeavor to represent the complexity of intracommunity
networks and worldviews (cf. Shirlow and McGovern 1997b), but I will also
address experiences that are commonly shared among many Protestants,
whether they prefer to define themselves as Protestants, unionists, or loyalists,
and thus I will often refer to the Protestant/unionist/loyalist (PUL) population or
community. That said, the data collected for this project lean toward workingclass and traditional organizations and “hard to reach” communities where one
finds strong Orange, loyalist, or unionist in-group identification.
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(p.18) Protestants, Unionists, Loyalists, and Ethnopolitical Identification
Since the partition of Northern Ireland in 1921 and throughout the Troubles,
Protestants have depended on political ascendancy and the strategic and
political interests of British governments to protect, both militarily and
economically, what Protestants have considered a necessary refuge in Ulster.
The proroguing of the unionist controlled Stormont government that presided
over Northern Ireland affairs from partition of the island in 1921 (separating
Northern Ireland from the southern Irish Free State) until the imposition of
Direct Rule from London in 1972 was a bitter pill for many unionists. However, it
was preferable to the alternative of a wholesale British withdrawal, the potential
of a civil war, and the prospects of becoming absorbed into a united Ireland
(Walker 2004:195–96). During thirty years of the Troubles, most Protestant
unionists’ attentions were turned to maintaining strategic pressure on British
governments through political maneuvering at Westminster and supporting the
police and military, and in some cases, paramilitary forces.
Today, Direct Rule has ended, including the long-anticipated devolution of justice
and policing powers; the principle of the consent of the majority has been
enshrined in political agreements, and the responsibilities of government have
been devolved to a power sharing executive at Stormont. Many of the
circumstances on which unionists and loyalists based their assumptions about
life in Northern Ireland have changed significantly. Under devolution, the
concepts of civil society and politics take on greater significance, and many
Protestants find themselves in a position for which they were not fully prepared.
In the absence of normal politics, and with the exception of moments of crisis,
there has been little development of an infrastructure of voluntary grassroots
organizations. Under the threat of republicanism, unionist politicians wielded
significant political capital in the halls of Westminster, but relatively little
working social capital has developed among Protestant organizations.
Often, Protestant communities in need of resources, such as, jobs and housing,
are not sufficiently empowered to advocate for and make full use of government
programs. Research by Blackbourn and Rekawek (2007) argues that the social
and economic dividends of peace have been pursued more aggressively in
Catholic communities than Protestant ones (pp. 80–81). A sense of British
identity remains strong among Protestants, and the union would appear
politically secure for the foreseeable future, but the quality of that future now
rests in their ability to organize and navigate a new and changing political
landscape.
In the introduction to their edited book on Protestants, unionists, and loyalists,
Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern (1997a) express the importance of forging a
new shared vision for relations on the island of Ireland: “In overall terms the
crisis facing Ireland, North and South, Catholic and Protestant, Nationalist and
Unionist, is to reconceptualise who ‘the People’ are in order to achieve a new
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social and (p.19) political consensus” (p. 9). Since the publication of their book,
a young and contested political dispensation has developed through the
negotiation of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and more recently through the
reestablishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly via a remarkable coalition of
Sinn Féin and the DUP, who were previously the most opposed among the large
political parties. The “social consensus” that Shirlow and McGovern propose is
less clear, however. Lingering sectarianism and polarized identities, while
showing signs of improvement, constitute a vexing backdrop to the end of the
Troubles and the establishment of power sharing governance.

Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland
If polarized and entrenched identities contribute to intractable conflict, the
transformation of those identities into ones with less defensive and more
inclusive orientations should occupy a central place in peacebuilding models.
Constructivist models offer a framework for understanding the opportunities for
and limits to identity change and the important role that symbols and cultural
activities play in mediating identity change, and chapter 2 addresses the central
role of identity formation in conflict transformation.
Three themes shape the analysis of conflict transformation among Protestant
unionists and loyalists that follows: capacity building, cultural innovation, and
pragmatic motivations. Cultural entrepreneurship figures prominently, but it is
important to pay attention to the strategic imperatives that motivate cultural
innovation and the organizational changes that contribute to the empowerment
of alienated Protestants.

Capacity Building
Material conditions, the capacity to organize in pursuit of collective interests,
and how a community perceives itself and its neighbors are closely related. Each
feeds into the level of security or insecurity that influences whether various
segments of unionism and loyalism are able and prepared to participate fully in
planning for the future and the transformation of conflict in Northern Ireland. If
fear, uncertainty, and inequality lie at the root of ethnopolitical conflict, conflict
transformation involves the development of resources that empower polarized
groups to engage nonviolently as equals and then acknowledge and take
advantage of their interdependence (Eyben, Morrow, and Wilson 1997; Mac
Ginty and du Toit 2007:29). Those resources may be political, economic, or
cultural, and it is worth noting that the distribution of resources within the
Protestant population is not uniform. Middle-class Protestants have been able to
avoid the worst of the violence of the Troubles and have tended to maintain a
comfortable distance from local politics, influencing policy through professional
organizations that lobbied (p.20) Direct Rule ministries. Historically, unionists
have looked at relatively poorer economic conditions in the Republic of Ireland
and argued that a united Ireland would mean being absorbed into an inferior
economy without British subsidy and would inevitably sacrifice quality of life.
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Middle-class unionists were no exception, and they oriented themselves toward
Britain to pursue their business interests and send their children to university
(Coulter 1997).
Working-class Protestants, with fortunes closely tied to manufacturing bases
that predominated in Northern Ireland, have seen the union as inextricably
linked with Ulster's industrial successes but have suffered from declines in
industrial production and its replacement by service and technology industries.
Economic and social problems including unemployment, low educational
attainment, and substance abuse plague working-class Protestant communities.
The trauma of the Troubles remains a fresh memory for adults and still echoes
today in interface tensions and outbreaks of violence that perpetuate a sense of
alienation, both from neighboring Catholic communities, which Protestants have
watched advance economically and politically, and from the Protestant middle
class, by which they feel abandoned (Blackbourn and Rekawek 2007). They
therefore draw on whatever sense of security their collective identity as British
citizens affords, insisting that their loyalty and service to the union, especially in
terms of military service, amounts to political capital. However, they are
simultaneously unsure or even skeptical about the value of that capital, as
British governments have signaled their willingness to see Northern Ireland
leave the union under the right conditions of popular consent (Coulter 1997:
116). Undermining insecurity remains a fundamental task for improving
community relations (Mac Ginty and du Toit 2007).
In her typology of approaches to community relations work, Mari Fitzduff (1991)
refers to “contextual community relations work” as activities, such as,
community development, building trusted and accessible security forces,
encouraging pluralist or mixed environments to encourage contact, targeting
social need, and training in critical thinking, that are necessary to create a
suitable environment for improvements in community relations. Unfortunately,
the fields of community relations and community development have often been
disconnected from one another, and yet, both are fundamental to the prospects
for sustainable peace (Eyben, Morrow, and Wilson 1997). This research takes up
the challenge of assessing the extent to which and the ways in which
organizations within the Protestant/unionist/loyalist (PUL) population are
seeking to adapt themselves to new political circumstances by building social
and cultural capital and organizing capacity.

Cultural Innovation and Collective Identities
In some cases, community development work parallels a kind of local singleidentity work that involves modifying cultural expressions and undertaking
historical education projects. To the extent that historical and cultural identity
work (p.21) helps to diminish a sense of uncertainty, builds confidence, enables
cross-community cooperation, and develops organizing skills that allow
grassroots organizations to advocate effectively for collective interests, it might
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be considered part of conflict transformation, though we should also consider
the countervailing trends that act as obstacles to such a process.
Modifying public expressions of collective identity, such as, parades and
bonfires, that have traditionally been seen as triumphalist, cannot simply be
programmed or made policy within an organization or community. The adoption
of new schemata is never a wholesale proposition. New ideas are smuggled into
group discourse in the very rituals and practices that sustain the continuity of
collective identities. Change, even heresy, is never far from tradition. Often
symbolic rituals, such as, bonfires and parades, can become sites at which
somewhat unorthodox group members, out of devotion to a tradition or
institution, seek to influence the discourse and dispositions of fellow
participants. Symbols closely associated with authority and tradition retain their
power even when they are appropriated and modified (within limits) to express
new ideas and new iterations of collective identity (Kurtz 1983; Smithey and
Young 2010).
Collective action and collective identity are thus closely related and mutually
recursive; a change in one signals or requires a change in the other. To the
extent that loyalists begin to emphasize publicly features of their identity that
are not defensive or expressions of mistrust or antipathy toward Catholics and
nationalists, they signal a new orientation across the political and ethnic divide.
They aim to maintain in-group solidarity and ontological security through these
practices, but as they adopt new forms that are less exclusive, they
incrementally lower the salience of sectarian and ethnopolitical boundaries that
have helped fuel conflict in Ireland and thus participate in conflict
transformation.

Pragmatics and Public Relations
Attempts to reorient collective identities are influenced by groups’ perceptions
of their adversaries and other influential social actors and are deeply implicated
with the ways in which they present themselves to those parties. Cultural
traditions projects attempt to shore up communal solidarity and improve
community esteem and confidence, but they also reframe collective identity in
ways that are more widely palatable to the general public, funders, and other
sources of local and international support. Thus, there is a pragmatic dimension
in which unionists and loyalists use cultural activities in the pursuit of political,
social, and economic goals. Protestant interviewees often speak of their cultural
traditions work in comparison with the successes that republicans have enjoyed
in their own transition to politics, community organizing, and international
public relations. Increasingly, Protestant organizations in Northern Ireland are
undertaking to build capacity for social change by developing community
organizing and public relations skills.
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(p.22) Yet, decisions to emphasize particular features of group history or
beliefs are not merely strategic. Leaders may not simply dictate core identities
to members. Modifications must be negotiated by individuals and groups,
sometimes leading to conflict internally, but the benefits to the group's political
or social capital may incentivize such attempts to reframe group identity. This
often takes the form of public relations work, media management, and the
modification of public expressions of identity.

Overview of the Book
Unionists and loyalists have not abandoned their objections to nationalism, and
they often continue to frame their agendas in relation to the real or imagined
threat of a return to republican violence and restrictions on their cultural
expressions. In this sense, ethnopolitical conflict in Northern Ireland continues
but in ways that open possibilities for cooperation and constructive competition.
Conflict is thereby transformed from the inside out among partisans, many of
whom once prioritized paramilitary or military violence. In 1995, after the IRA
committed itself to a cease-fire, Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Féin,
famously declared, “They haven’t gone away, you know,” to the disgust of
Protestants across Northern Ireland. (Many unionists still question whether the
IRA has gone away if its Army Council continues to exist.) Portadown's District
Orange Master, Daryl Hewitt, echoed the line after his Orange lodge's
leadership met with Adams to discuss their dispute with nationalist Garvaghy
Road residents (2008). Neither has gone away, but they have not stayed the
same either.
The rest of this book examines a contested process by which self-described
unionists and loyalists navigate a contested social psychological landscape
where identity and action are inseparably intertwined. As we discuss in chapter
2, conflict transformation involves changes in the way conflict is carried out. The
political peace process, a form of sophisticated conflict management, has
constructed an arena in which even the most militant parties believe they can
pursue their core interests. Support for political parties remains one way of
signaling collective identity, but as we will see in subsequent chapters, rituals
and other symbolic activities offer another arena in which many unionists and
loyalists are active and in which we find an intentional shift toward developing
the arts of persuasion.
Chapter 3 details the development of the peace process and the political
circumstances in which unionists and loyalists find themselves. Chapters 4, 5,
and 6 follow symbolic and ritualistic expressions of ethnopolitical identity
through activities that are often associated with tradition or heritage, such as,
murals, bonfires, parades, reenactments, and amateur historical pursuits. In
each case, unionists and loyalists have been modifying some of their most
cherished activities to expand their appeal within their own communities and
further afield. Such modifications are important because they both reflect and
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require that they can be justified within the frames of the collective identities
they represent (p.23) and thus become part of the slow iterative process of
identity transformation as well.
The process is not purely endogenous to unionist and loyalist communities and
organizations, though it must be said that that is where much of the action of
conflict transformation occurs. As we discuss in chapter 6, sea changes in the
political sphere have forced unionists and loyalists into reconsidering their
positions and their futures. Some have resolved that they must develop a new
political influence that is not purely associated with British patronage. The
development of public relations skills is not surprisingly applied first to their
most public expressions of identity. Moreover, the state has incentivized the
mitigation of cultural expressions of identity, which fits into the consociational
model embodied in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Thus, while much of the
process of conflict transformation detailed in the book revolves around culture,
identity, and emotion, there are important pragmatic dimensions to consider as
well. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings, anticipates the future of
conflict transformation in Northern Ireland, and raises cautionary questions
about the potential limits and pitfalls that unionists and loyalists might
encounter and the ramifications for community relations.
Notes:

(1.) Murals are large paintings, often found on the gable ends of houses that,
historically, have displayed themes of ethnic identity and political ideology.
During “the Troubles,” thirty years of armed conflict since the late 1960s,
murals often valorized paramilitaries and armed struggle.
(2.) Republican and loyalist paramilitaries are non-state armed organizations
formed to challenge or defend British rule and unionism in Ireland, respectively.
(3.) European football is called soccer in the United States.
(4.) Best had died only five months after my original visit to Wright's mural,
which was redesigned and unveiled in May 2006. He had played for both
Manchester United and Northern Ireland, and the mural portrayed him twice,
once in his red Manchester uniform and again wearing his green Northern
Ireland gear.
(5.) Extensive interviews were conducted within grassroots unionist
organizations and communities. Excerpts of these interviews appear throughout
the book. All interviewees were assigned pseudonyms.
(6.) The Orange Order is one of several all-male fraternal organizations that
dedicate themselves to the preservation of the Protestant faith and British
sovereignty in Ireland. The Orange Order is the best known, though others
(some closely affiliated with the Orange Order) include the Apprentice Boys of
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Derry, the Independent Orange Order, the Royal Black Preceptory, and the Royal
Arch Purple. On July 12 each year, the Orange Order celebrates the victory in
1698 of King William III's victory over the Jacobite forces of James II at the
Battle of the Boyne. The Twelfth celebrations are preceded on the Eleventh
Night by celebrations and the burning of large bonfires in Protestant
communities across Northern Ireland. Tricolour flags of the Republic of Ireland
and other nationalist or republican symbols are often burned with the bonfires.
(7.) Ruane and Todd's (1996) approach to conflict transformation similarly calls
for action at cultural, structural, and relational levels (pp. 306–15).
(8.) The distinctions between unionism and loyalism or nationalism and
republicanism are often not clear, and usage is contested, changing from context
to context, but I offer a brief explanation here for readers uninitiated in
Northern Ireland politics. In its broadest sense, nationalism refers to the
universe of political positions that advocate a united Ireland. More specifically,
“nationalist” refers to those people, primarily Catholic, whose political goals
emphasize civil equality for all and redressing decades of discrimination against
Catholics. Many nationalists value Gaelic culture and a united Ireland and prefer
constitutional means of pursuing their political goals. “Republicans” are
nationalists, often working class, who insist on equality and a united Ireland but
have been willing to use both violent and institutional political means. The
paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the political party Sinn
Féin are the most prominent organizations within the republican movement.
Broadly, “unionism” refers to a commitment to Northern Ireland's remaining
part of the United Kingdom. In its particular sense, unionism refers to a stance
institutionalized in political parties supported primarily by Protestants (e.g., the
Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party) that focuses on
Northern Ireland's membership in the United Kingdom and British identity
(Miller 1978; Hennessey 1996; Ruane and Todd 1996). “Loyalism” refers to an
ideology or cultural stance held by many Protestants, usually working class, who
insist on Northern Ireland's remaining part of the United Kingdom while also
defending Protestant culture and identity. Loyalists’ cultural commitments may
include Protestant evangelicalism and a contractual or covenantal view of their
relationship to the British crown (Whyte 1990; Brewer and Higgins 1998). Like
republicanism, the term “loyalism” also often refers to support for paramilitary
organizations, such as, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF).
(9.) The Northern Ireland Assembly is the elected legislative body established by
the 1998 Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA).
(10.) “Peacebuilding” is often used to refer to initiatives that aim to transform
attitudes and build capacity in civil society while “peacemaking” usually refers
Page 23 of 24

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 04 November 2020

Introduction
to attempts to encourage dialogue and negotiations among political figures or
individuals with political influence. “Peacekeeping” is a form of conflict
management that includes the capacity to keep opponents from attacking one
another (Galtung 1975:224; Ryan 1995).
(11.) Northern Ireland consists of six of the traditional nine counties of Ulster.
Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan remain in the Republic of Ireland.
(12.) After protracted negotiations, the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement
established a power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland. It was signed by
major political parties on April 10, 1998, and it was endorsed in subsequent
referenda in both the north and south.
(13.) The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey is an annual omnibus survey
conducted by Access Resource Knowledge Northern Ireland (ARK) and cosponsored by Queen's University and the University of Ulster.
(14.) Research by Ian Shuttleworth and Chris Lloyd (2006) using 2001 census
data, however, indicates that levels of actual segregation have probably
remained the same throughout the 1990s, findings that moderate but do not
extinguish concerns about levels of division between Catholics and Protestants.
(15.) Forty-seven percent of youth respondents living in primarily Catholic areas
had no Protestant friends, and the corresponding rate for Protestants was 34
percent.
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